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INTRODUCTION 
The general prohibition against hearsay1 testimony serves as 
one of our legal system’s most fundamental guarantees of truth.2  
The cardinal flaw of hearsay evidence lies in our inability to 
assess the testimonial capacities of the declarant.3  While 
traditional courtroom mechanisms, such as the oath, the jury’s 
perception of witness demeanor, and cross-examination test the 
truth and accuracy of in-court statements, these safeguards are 
 
 ∗ J.D. Yale Law School, 2001.  I am indebted to Professor Steven Duke of the Yale 
Law School for his guidance and invaluable comments and thank Sterling Professor 
of Law Mirjan R. Damaska of the Yale Law School and Professor George Fisher of the 
Stanford Law School for reviewing drafts of this Article. 
 1 Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than the one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted.” FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 2 See 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT THE COMMON LAW § 
1364, at 28 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1974) (praising the rule against 
hearsay as “the most characteristic rule of the Anglo-American law of 
evidence — a rule which may be esteemed, next to jury trial, the greatest 
contribution of that eminently practical legal system to the world’s method 
of procedure”); see also Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1913) 
(noting that hearsay’s exclusion rests in principles of common law). 
 3 This evidentiary concern explains why the definition of hearsay is 
limited to statements offered for “the truth of the matter asserted.” FED. R. 
EVID. 801(c).  If the probative value of the declaration is solely that it was 
made and the listener heard it, rather than its actual truth, the declaration 
falls beyond the scope of Rule 801’s definition. See, e.g., Howley v. Town of 
Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 155 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding declarant’s statements 
not hearsay “since that testimony would be offered not to prove the truth of 
his statements but only to prove that he made them”); United States v. 
Bellomo, 176 F.3d 580, 586 (2d Cir.) (“Statements offered as evidence of 
commands or threats or rules directed to the witness, rather than for the 
truth of the matter asserted therein, are not hearsay.”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 
987 (1999). 
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lacking for out-of-court statements.4  Of course, the exclusion of 
hearsay testimony is far from absolute.  The Federal Rules of 
Evidence and the state counterparts recognize several 
exceptions to the hearsay rule for circumstances where 
overriding policy justifications warrant admission of an out-of-
court statement.5  In these enumerated instances, some 
enhanced reliability or special necessity outweighs the 
testimonial concerns inherent to out-of-court statements. 
This Article explores one of these hearsay exceptions, 
namely Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3)’s admission of 
statements against the declarant’s interests, with a critical eye 
on the rule’s underlying rationale.  Simply put, Rule 804(b)(3) 
rests on a behavioral approach to law that mirrors rational actor 
theory.6  The Rule contemplates that if a reasonable person 
makes a statement against interests, the statement is unlikely to 
be a fabrication and thus retains substantial reliability.7  While 
at first blush this rationale may appear logical, if not intuitive,8 
deeper reflection unearths serious psychological flaws.  In 
particular, the literal rationale of the rule is unattainable.  
Under a rational actor paradigm, persons do not consciously act 
against their interests, but instead act to maximize their self-
interest.9  A rational actor who truly perceived a declaration to 
be contrary to his interests would not have made the statement.  
 
 4 In Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 598 (1994), the Supreme 
Court stated the following: 
[T]he ways in which these dangers [of lying, misperception, faulty 
memory, and confusion] are minimized for in-court statements — the 
oath, the witness’ awareness of the gravity of the proceedings, the jury’s 
ability to observe the witness’ demeanor, and, most importantly, the 
right of the opponent to cross-examine — are generally absent for 
things said out of court. 
See also Donnelly, 228 U.S. at 273 (noting similar flaws in hearsay evidence). 
 5 The exceptions to the hearsay bar are articulated in Rule 803 and Rule 
804. FED. R. EVID. 803 (enumerating twenty-three exceptions where the 
declarant’s availability is immaterial); FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (listing five 
exceptions where the declarant is unavailable).  In addition, Rule 801(d) 
identifies two types of out-of-court statements that do not qualify as hearsay. 
FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (listing prior statements by witnesses and admissions by 
party-opponents as not hearsay). 
 6 See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Symposium: Passing Through the Door: Social Movement 
Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 22-34 (2001) (overviewing 
rational actor theory). 
 7 See infra PART I.B. 
 8 The Supreme Court characterized Rule 804(b)(3)’s underlying 
rationale as a “commonsense notion.”  Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599. 
 9 Rubin, supra note 6, at 23. 
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Rather, a rational actor makes a statement because, in his view, 
at the instant of declaration it was in his interests to make it.  
When a person acts otherwise, the rule’s reliability is wanting 
because the individual fails to act reasonably.10  Furthermore, 
apart from this fundamental psychological flaw, enhanced 
deficiencies relate to statements pertaining to penal interests.  
Empirical research and common experience reveal myriad 
reasons why persons make untrue, self-incriminating 
statements.11  Although these statements may be against the 
declarant’s penal interests, they hardly are against the person’s 
true personal interests.  These deeper, personal interests are 
what motivate a person to lie. 
Yet, the effects Congress envisioned by enacting 804(b)(3) 
are quite desirable.  Through Rule 804(b)(3), Congress sought 
to identify statements that are most likely to be true.  
Notwithstanding the flaws in the current structure of the Rule, a 
modest reformulation can achieve the guarantees of 
trustworthiness that Congress envisioned, while remaining 
faithful to rational actor theory.  This Article proposes a two-
step reformulation.  First, Congress must alter the Rule’s inquiry 
away from whether the statement is against the declarant’s 
interests, as such a creature simply does not exist.  A more 
cogent query asks whether the statement, if untrue, would have 
been against the declarant’s interests.  Second, because of the 
dubious trustworthiness of statements against a declarant’s 
penal interests, Rule 804(b)(3) should return to its common law 
roots and only admit statements relating to proprietary and 
pecuniary interests. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  I begin in Part I with 
an overview of Rule 804(b)(3).  I explain the history of the 
exception, the modern formulation, and the underlying 
reliability rationale that Congress used to justify a hearsay 
exception.  In Part II, however, I demonstrate fatal errors in 
Congress’s conclusion that statements admitted under the 
current structure of Rule 804(b)(3) carry greater indicia of 
reliability.  Not only can the true rationale of the rule never be 
satisfied because reasonable persons do not consciously act 
 
 10 See infra PART II.A. 
 11 See infra PART III.B.  But see also Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599 (stating that “Rule 
804(b)(3) is founded on the commonsense notion that reasonable people, even 
reasonable people who are not especially honest, tend not to make self-inculpatory 
statements unless they believe them to be true”). 
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against their interests, but also a statement tending to subject a 
person to criminal liability is inherently suspect.  Part III offers 
a solution.  By reformulating Rule 804(b)(3) to address a more 
realistic conception of humans reasoning, many of the flaws 
discussed in Part II can be eradicated.  As specified in Part III, 
this modification entails both restructuring the central inquiry 
of the rule and eradicating any exception for statements 
pertaining to the declarant’s penal interests. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF RULE 804(b)(3) 
A.  Historical Background of the Contemporary Standard 
Enacted by Congress in 1975,12 Rule 804(b)(3) allows the 
admission of statements against interests made by unavailable 
nonparties.13  The threshold requirement of Rule 804(b)(3), as 
with all Rule 804 exceptions, is the declarant’s unavailability.14  
An exhaustive enumeration of the circumstances that qualify for 
unavailability is set forth in Rule 804(a).15  Once the declarant’s 
 
 12 Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1942 (1975); see Williamson, 512 U.S. at 
612 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 13 A statement made by a party, which is offered by an adverse party, is 
admissible under Rule 801(d)(2) as a statement by a party-opponent. FED. R. 
EVID. 801(d)(2).  Rule 801(d)(2) presents a far more lenient standard for 
admissibility than Rule 804(b)(3).  For an out-of-court statement by an 
adverse party to be admissible, Rule 801(d)(2) does not require the 
unavailability of the declarant, and the statement does not need to be against 
the declarant’s interests at the instant of declaration.  Statements by party 
opponents are excluded “on the theory that their admissibility in evidence is 
the result of the adversary system, rather than the satisfaction of the 
conditions of the hearsay rule.”  FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note 
(citing EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 265 (1962); John S. 
Strahorn, A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and Admissions, 85 U. PA. L. 
REV. 484, 564 (1937); 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON 
LAW § 1048 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1972)). 
 14 See, e.g., Eileen A. Scallen, Symposium: Analyzing “The Politics of [Evidence] 
Rulemaking”, 53 HASTINGS L. J. 843, 884 n.82 (2002). 
 15 Unavailability includes situations in which the declarant: 
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from 
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant’s statement; 
or 
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the 
declarant’s statement despite an order of the court to do so; or 
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant’s 
statement; or 
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death 
or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement has 
been unable to procure the declarant’s attendance (or in the case of a 
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unavailability is established, Rule 804(b)(3) admits statements 
that satisfy the following requirements: 
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to 
the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended 
to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render 
invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable 
person in the declarant’s position would not have made the 
statement unless believing it to be true.  A statement tending to 
expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate 
the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances 
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.16 
In sum, the Rule admits statements contrary to a person’s legal 
interests, provided they are of the sort that a reasonable person 
would not have made unless true. 
The exception for statements against a declarant’s interests 
has deep historical roots.  Common law admitted statements 
against the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interests but 
refused to extend the exception to statements against penal 
interests.17  The most famous articulation of the common law 
rule came in 1844 by the House of Lords in the seminal Sussex 
Peerage Case.18  The House of Lords limited the exception to 
statements against the declarant’s proprietary or pecuniary 
interests by holding that the defendant could not offer 
supporting evidence that amounted to a criminal confession 
made by an individual unavailable to testify.19  For over 120 
 
hearsay exception under subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), the declarant’s 
attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means. 
FED. R. EVID. 804(a).  In addition: 
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim 
of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or 
wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for the purpose of 
preventing the witness from attending or testifying. 
Id. 
 16 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). 
 17 FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee’s note to Subdivision (b), 
Exception (3), 1972 Proposed Rules (“The common law required that the 
interest declared against be pecuniary or proprietary . . . .”); Emily F. Duck, 
The Williamson Standard for the Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay for 
Statements Against Penal Interest, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1084, 1085-86 
(1995); Bernard S. Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An Exception to the 
Hearsay Rule, 58 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29-52 (1944). 
 18 Sussex Peerage Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (H.L. 1844); see 2 JOHN W. 
STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 318, at 340 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter 
MCCORMICK]. 
 19 Sussex Peerage, 8 Eng. Rep. at 1045; MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 318, at 
340.  At issue was whether Augstus D’Este was the legitimate son of the Duke 
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years, until the enactment of Rule 804(b)(3), American courts 
followed the Sussex Peerage holding and refused to expand the 
exception to include statements against penal interests.20 
Rule 804(b)(3) remains faithful to the common law rule in 
certain respects.  First, the Rule codifies common law by 
allowing the admission of statements against pecuniary or 
proprietary interests.21  In addition, the modern rule tracks 
common law by not admitting statements against social 
interests.22  The Supreme Court’s proposed rule originally 
admitted statements that went against an individual’s social 
interests, such as those that would make the declarant the 
“object of hatred, ridicule or disgrace.”23  Consistent with 
common law, Congress deleted this provision, citing reliability 
concerns.24  Several scholars have criticized Congress’s 
reasoning, arguing that social interests can provide just as 
strong incentives for truthfulness as proprietary or pecuniary 
interests.25 
 
of Sussex. D’Este attempted to prove his mother had been married to the 
Duke by offering evidence of statements made by a deceased clergyman who 
performed the marriage.  The statement would have been against the 
deceased clergyman’s criminal interests because he performed the marriage 
in violation of The Royal Marriage Act.  Sussex Peerage, 8 Eng. Rep. at 1045. 
 20 See Sussex Peerage, 8 Eng. Rep. at 1045; Peter W. Tague, Perils of the 
Rulemaking Process: The Development, Application, and Unconstitutionality of Rule 
804(b)(3)’s Penal Interest Exception, 69 GEO. L.J. 851, 859 (1981) (“American 
courts heedlessly have followed the dictum in the Sussex Peerage.”); see also 
Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1913) (relying in part on the 
Sussex Peerage Case to hold a statement inadmissible because it was against the 
declarant’s penal interests only). 
 21 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3); see FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee’s note to 
Subdivision (b), Exception (3), 1972 Proposed Rules (The common law required 
that the interest declared be pecuniary or proprietary . . . .”); Duck, supra note 17, at 
1085-86; Jefferson, supra note 17, at 29-52; see also Sussex Peerage, 8 Eng. Rep. at 1045. 
 22 Glen Weissenberger, Federal Rule of Evidence 804: Admissible Hearsay from 
an Unavailable Declarant, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 1079, 1115 (1987). 
 23 MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 319, at 343; Tague, supra note 20, at 866 
(citing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence 
for the United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 378 (1969)). 
A handful of states have adopted provisions admitting statements against an 
individual’s social interests. MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 319, at 343 (citing 
cases in Oregon and Pennsylvania). 
 24 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) Note by Federal Judicial Center; 
Weissenberger, supra note 22, at 1115 n.160. 
 25 See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 318, at 340 (“Declarations against 
social interest, such as acknowledgements of facts which would subject the 
declarant to ridicule or disgrace, or facts calculated to arouse in the 
declarant a sense of shame or remorse, seem adequately buttressed in 
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Rule 804(b)(3), however, makes one significant departure 
from common law.26  If a statement is of the sort that tends to 
subject a person to criminal liability at the time of its 
declaration, it may qualify as a hearsay exception.27  In a 
criminal trial, a statement against penal interests may either 
inculpate or exculpate the defendant.  If offered to exonerate 
the accused, the statement is admissible as long as sufficient 
indicia of reliability support its trustworthiness.28  The admission 
of statements against penal interests had little support prior to 
the enactment of Rule 804(b)(3).  As articulated in Sussex 
Peerage, common law refused to admit statements against penal 
interests.29  In addition, prior to Congress’s adoption of Rule 
804(b)(3), the Supreme Court rejected the penal interests 
exception in Donnelly v. United States,30 holding that these 
statements lack sufficient reliability to justify a hearsay 
 
trustworthiness and should be received under the present principle.”); 
Edward J. Imwinkelried, People v. Simpson: Perspectives on the Implications for 
the Criminal Justice System: Declarations Against Social Interest: The (Still) 
Embarrassingly Neglected Hearsay Exception, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1427, 1451-57 
(1996) (arguing that courts should employ the declaration against social 
interests theory more often); Jefferson, supra note 17, at 39 (observing that a 
person is unlikely “to concede the existence of facts which would make him 
an object of social disapproval in the community unless the facts are true”). 
 26 JON R. WALTZ, THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 134 (1973); David 
Robinson, Jr., From Fat Tony and Matty the Horse to the Sad Case of A.T.: 
Defensive and Offensive Use of Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Cases, 32 HOUS. L. 
REV. 895, 920 n.179 (1995); Michael M. Martin, The Supreme Court Rules on 
Statements Against Interest, 11 TOURO L. REV. 179, 181 (1994); Weissenberger, 
supra note 22, at 1114. 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, dissenting in Donnelly v. United States, asserted 
the reliability of a criminal confession, stating “no other statement is so much against 
interest as a confession of murder; it is far more calculated to convince than dying 
declarations . . . .” 228 U.S. 243, 278 (1913) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citing Mattox v. 
United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892)). 
Some states have rejected similar expansion of their versions of Rule 804(b)(3) 
to include statements tending to subject the declarant to criminal liability. See, e.g., 
Charles W. Gamble, Drafting, Adopting and Interpreting the New Alabama Rules of 
Evidence: A Reporter’s Perspective, 47 ALA. L. REV. 1, 24 n.139 (1995) (citing ALA. R. 
EVID. 804(b)(3); ALA. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee’s note) (discussing Alabama’s 
refusal to adopt such an expansion). 
 27 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). 
 28 Id. (“A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability 
and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating 
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.”); see, 
e.g., Jennings v. Maynard, 946 F.2d 1502, 1506 (10th Cir. 1991) (discussing 
indicia of reliability supporting the trustworthiness of a statement admitted 
under Rule 803(b)(3)). 
 29 Sussex Peerage Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034, 1045 (H.L. 1844). 
 30 228 U.S. 243 (1913). 
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exception.31 
Perhaps the greatest challenge in applying Rule 804(b)(3) 
is assessing whether a statement truly stands contrary to the 
declarant’s interests.  As the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 
804(b)(3) instructs, this analysis “must be determined from the 
circumstances of each case.”32  In addition, the text of the rule 
requires the judge to consider the mindset of a reasonable 
person in the declarant’s position at the time the statement was 
made.33  These requirements amount to an objective 
determination of whether a reasonable person, aware of the 
potential consequences of the statement, would have made the 
statement.34 
Further debate surrounds the ambiguous scope of Rule 
804(b)(3).  In particular, should a statement in its entirety be 
admitted, or should the statement be parsed so that only those 
parts contrary to the declarant’s interests be admitted?  The 
plain text of Rule 804(b)(3) provides little guidance here.35  
Wigmore noted a related challenge when the statement against 
interests refers to or incorporates the collateral statement.36  
The federal circuit courts of appeals split fairly evenly on the 
admissibility of such collateral, non-inculpatory statements.37  In 
 
 31 Id. 
 32 FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee’s note to Subdivision (b), 
Exception (3); see United States v. Layton, 855 F.2d 1388, 1405 (9th Cir. 
1988) (holding that whether a hearsay statement bears sufficient indicia of 
reliability depends on the particular circumstances under which the 
statement was made), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1046 (1989). 
 33 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (“[A] reasonable person in the declarant’s 
position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true.”). 
 34 See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 299-
300 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding testimony inadmissible under Rule 804(b)(3) 
because the plaintiffs failed to show that the declarants were “conscious” that 
the testimony was not in their best interests); see Jennings, 946 F.2d at1506 
(concluding that the declarant must have understood that his statement to 
an Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation agent could subject him to 
criminal liability). 
 35 See, e.g., Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 612 (1994) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The text of the Rule does not tell us whether 
collateral statements are admissible . . . .”); Michael D. Bergeisen, Note, 
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and Inculpatory Statements Against Penal 
Interest, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1202 (1978). 
 36 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1456, at 341. 
 37 For examples of decisions holding collateral, non-inculpatory remarks 
admissible under Rule 804(b)(3), see United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244 
(1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Garris, 616 F.2d 626 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 447 
U.S. 926 (1980); and United States v. Casemento, 887 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081 (1990).  For examples of decisions holding 
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1994, the Supreme Court resolved this circuit split in Williamson 
v. United States,38 holding that the exception does not 
incorporate collateral remarks.39  Writing for the majority, 
Justice O’Connor interpreted Rule 804(b)(3) as admitting “only 
those declarations or remarks within the confession that are 
individually self-inculpatory.”40  Therefore, Rule 804(b)(3) does 
not allow admission of “non-self-inculpatory statements, even if 
they are made within a broader narrative that is generally self-
inculpatory.”41 
B.  Rationale Underlying Rule 804(b)(3) 
Hearsay exceptions retain certain policy rationales that lie 
either in necessity or reliability, or both.42  For example, excited 
utterances are admissible43 because statements are presumed to 
have enhanced reliability if the declarant lacks sufficient time to 
devise a fabrication.44  A similar presumption of greater 
reliability underlies the exception for statements made for the 
 
collateral, non-inculpatory remarks inadmissible under Rule 804(b)(3), see 
United States v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1978), and United States v. Porter, 
881 F.2d 878 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989). 
 38 512 U.S. 594 (1994). 
 39 Id. at 598-602. 
 40 Id. at 599. 
 41 Id. at 600-01; see also United States v. Price, 134 F.3d 340, 347 (6th Cir.) 
(holding that “collateral statements, even ones neutral as to interests,” are 
inadmissible despite their close proximity to the self-inculpatory statements), 
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 845 (1998). 
 42 Weissenberger, supra note 22, at 1117 (“Like the other hearsay 
exceptions contained in Rules 803 and 804, the exception for statement 
against interest is predicated upon the dual grounds of necessity and 
trustworthiness.”); see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (citation 
omitted) (holding that a hearsay statement is admissible only if it bears 
adequate “indicia of reliability”). 
 43 FED. R. EVID. 803(2). 
 44 Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990) (noting that excited 
utterances are admissible because “such statements are given under 
circumstances that eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or 
confabulation”); FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note (“The theory of 
[the excited utterance exception] is simply that circumstances may produce a 
condition of excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection 
and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication.”); Robert M. Hutchins 
& Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28 COLUM. L. 
REV. 432, 435 (1928) (“[U]nder certain external circumstances of physical 
shock a state of nervous excitement may be produced which stills the 
reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the utterance which 
occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and 
perceptions already produced by the external shock.”). 
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purpose of medical diagnosis45 on the theory that an individual 
in need of medical care has strong motivations to be truthful 
because of the natural desire to receive proper and accurate 
medical treatment.46  In enacting Rule 804(b)(3), Congress 
concluded that statements against interests possess compelling 
necessity and reliability justifications that warrant admission.47 
The necessity component rests in the unavailability prong 
of the Rule 804 exceptions, which requires a compelling 
justification for the declarant’s inability to provide the 
testimony in court.  Wigmore explained that the necessity 
principle “signifies the impossibility of obtaining other evidence 
from the same source . . . .”48  In these cases where “the witness 
is practically unavailable, his statements should be received.”49  
Of course, not all statements of unavailable declarants are 
admissible, so further indicia of reliability are needed. 
The Advisory Committee explained that the reliability of 
declarations against interests arises from the presumption that 
“persons do not make statements which are damaging to 
themselves unless satisfied for good reason that they are true.”50  
Because of this enhanced reliability, statements against interests 
are admitted under the theory that the traditional courtroom 
safeguards of a judicial oath and cross-examination are 
supplanted by the powerful human sanction of self-interests.51 
The reliability rationale has remained paramount to 
 
 45 FED. R. EVID. 803(4). 
 46 FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note to paragraph (4). 
 47 FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee’s note to Subdivision (b), 
Exception (3) (discussing “[t]he circumstantial guaranty of reliability for 
declarations against interest”); Weissenberger, supra note 22, at 1117 (“[T]he 
exception for statement against interest is predicated upon the dual grounds 
of necessity and reliability.”). 
 48 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1456, at 326. 
 49 Id. 
 50 FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee’s note to Subdivision (b), 
Exception (3) (citing Hileman v. Northwest Eng’g Co., 346 F.2d 668 (6th Cir. 
1965)); accord United States v. Harty, 930 F.2d 1257, 1264 (7th Cir.) (“‘[t]he 
circumstantial guarantee of reliability for declarations against interest is the 
assumption that people do not make statements which are damaging to 
themselves unless satisfied for good reason that they are true.’”) (quoting 
FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee’s note), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 894 
(1991); Hileman v. Northwest Eng’g Co., 346 F.2d 668, 670 (6th Cir. 1965); 
MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 317, at 335-36 (noting that the trustworthiness 
safeguard is established “[u]nder the theory that people generally do not 
lightly make statements that are damaging to their interests”). 
 51 Weissenberger, supra note 22, at 1118. 
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judicial interpretations of Rule 804(b)(3).  This preoccupation 
with reliability explains the Supreme Court’s narrow 
construction of Rule 804(b)(3) in Williamson that safeguarded 
against the risk of declarants combining incriminating 
information and neutral or self-serving statements within the 
same statement.52  The Court reasoned, “Rule 804(b)(3) is 
founded on the commonsense notion that reasonable people, 
even reasonable people who are not especially honest, tend not 
to make self-inculpatory statements unless they believe them to 
be true.”53  This reliability is unique to self-inculpatory 
statements because, as the Court explained in Williamson, “the 
very fact that a statement is genuinely self-inculpatory . . . is 
itself one of the ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ 
that makes a statement admissible.”54  Even if a defendant makes 
a generally self-inculpatory narrative, those parts of the 
narrative which are not self-inculpatory possess no added 
reliability.55  These reliability concerns intensify if the declarant 
believes that a non-inculpatory remark would be admissible 
provided it was intertwined with an inculpatory statement. 
Courts also emphasize reliability concerns when 
considering the admission of statements that are contrary to a 
person’s legal interests in certain respects, but in furtherance of 
his interests in other respects.  For example, courts are 
reluctant to admit statements against pecuniary interests if it is 
possible that the declarant foresaw that his statement could be 
used to his benefit in a subsequent litigation.56  If a statement 
conceivably could go in both directions its reliability is severely 
undercut.  The reliability rationale also underscored Congress’s 
 
 52 Elissa J. Ferrante, Note, The Statements Against Penal Interest Exception to 
the Hearsay Rule After Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999): Making the 
Distinction Between Custodial and Non-Custodial Statements for Sixth Amendment 
Analysis, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 519, 533 (2001) (noting that the Supreme Court in 
Williamson “required a higher level of reliability for [admission of] 
statements under Rule 804(b)(3)”). 
 53 Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599 (1994). 
 54 Id. at 605. 
 55 Id.  The approach taken in Williamson mirrors that of the California 
Supreme Court in People v. Leach, 541 P.2d 296 (1975).  In Leach, the court 
held that only the portions of a statement specifically against the declarant’s 
interests are admissible.  Id. at 311 (interpreting CAL. EVID. CODE § 1230 
(West 1966)). 
 56 See Rock v. Huffco Gas & Oil Co., Inc., 922 F.2d 272, 282-83 (5th Cir. 
1991) (holding that the plaintiff-declarant most likely realized that his 
statements to an insurance adjuster would be used in forthcoming litigation, 
thereby creating a motive to fabricate). 
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refusal to extend the rule to statements against social interests.  
Despite the Supreme Court’s inclusion of such statements in its 
proposed rule, the House Judiciary Committee deleted the 
provision reasoning that these statements “lack[] sufficient 
guarantees of reliability.”57  This diminished reliability stems 
from the concern that because of society’s constantly changing 
moral norms, courts cannot objectively discern whether a 
particular declarant perceived the statement to be contrary to 
his interests.58 
II.  DEFICIENCIES IN RULE 804(b)(3)’S RELIABILITY RATIONALE 
Perhaps Rule 804(b)(3)’s seemingly intuitive premise has 
shielded it from the scrutiny it needs.  In particular, two fatal flaws 
reside in the current text of Rule 804(b)(3).  First, is it even possible 
for a reasonable person to make a statement against his interests?  A 
person acting consciously and reasonably behaves in line with his 
interests, thereby defeating the reliability guarantee of the rule.  
Second, does the reliability guarantee carry any force with statements 
against penal interests?  Although criminal punishments may appear 
more severe to an outside observer, a person’s motivations for 
fabricating self-inculpatory statements are appreciably stronger and 
more common in the criminal context than in the civil context. 
A.  Reasonable Persons Do Not Act Consciously Against Their Interests 
The basic theory for the reliability of statements against 
interests is relatively straightforward.  A person is unlikely to 
make a statement against his own interests unless that statement 
is true.59  At first blush, this intuition may appear 
commonsensical.60  Further reflection, however, forces us to 
reconsider the Rule’s wisdom, particularly in light of the Rule’s 
consciousness and reasonableness requirements. 
Rule 804(b)(3) imposes four requirements relevant to this 
 
 57 HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, H.R. Rep. No. 
93-650, at 16 (1973) (citing United States v. Dovico, 380 F.2d 325, 327 nn.2, 4 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 944 (1967)). 
 58 Weissenberger, supra note 22, at 1115 (“Where only ‘social’ interests 
are concerned, the requisite guarantees of trustworthiness are not thought 
sufficiently high to outweigh the danger that, in a world of rapidly changing 
moral attitudes, the statement may not have been against the declarant’s 
interest as he or she perceived it.”). 
 59 See supra PART I.B. 
 60 See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599 (referring to Rule 804(b)(3)’s rationale 
as a “commonsense notion”). 
 2002 REFORMING FRE 804(b)(3) 13 
criticism.  First is the Rule’s objective reasonableness standard.  
The text of Rule 804(b)(3) leaves no doubt that the 
determination of whether a statement is against interests must 
be made objectively from the perspective of a rational actor.  
The Rule instructs that a statement is admissible if “a reasonable 
person in the declarant’s position would not have made the 
statement unless believing it to be true.”61  As the language 
compels, courts have interpreted this standard from the 
objective perspective of a reasonable person in the declarant’s 
position, not necessarily the declarant himself.62 
Second, the declarant must have understood the statement 
to be against his interests.  Without this consciousness prong, 
the declarant would lack adequate basis for making a reasonable 
determination, thus eradicating the statement’s reliability.  
Because of the declarant’s unavailability, conclusive proof of 
actual awareness is often impossible.63  Therefore, courts have 
looked at the surrounding circumstances to determine whether 
a reasonable declarant knew and understood the ramifications 
of the statement.64 The traditional approach has required 
apparent awareness by the declarant that the statement was 
contrary to his interests.65  Some courts have even required 
proof that the declarant was subjectively aware of the danger to 
his interests.66 
The third requirement is closely related to the second, but 
merits elaboration.  Rule 804(b)(3) imposes a temporal analysis 
made from the instant of the declaration.  The Rule explicitly 
provides that it addresses statements that are contrary to the 
declarant’s interests at the time they are made.67  The Rule does 
 
 61 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (“[A] reasonable person in the declarant’s 
position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true.”). 
 62 See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224, 232 (4th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1103 (1983); United States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687, 
691 n.1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978). 
 63 See, e.g., WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1456, at 321. 
 64 Weissenberger, supra note 22, at 1120. 
 65 Id. 
 66 See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 299-
300 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding testimony inadmissible under Rule 804(b)(3) 
because the plaintiffs failed to show that the declarants were “conscious” that 
the testimony was not in their best interests); see also Jennings v. Maynard, 
946 F.2d 1502, 1506 (10th Cir. 1991) (concluding that the declarant must 
have understood that his statement to an Oklahoma State Bureau of 
Investigation agent could subject him to criminal liability). 
 67 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). 
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not allow for ex post consideration of the effects of the 
statement.  What matters is whether the declarant perceived the 
statement as against his interests at the time of the declaration, 
not at some latter point. 
Rule 804(b)(3)’s final requirement pertains to its scope.  
The exception does not apply to all interests, but only to legal 
ones.  Statements may be admissible only if they are “contrary to 
the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or . . . tended 
to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability.”68  
Therefore, a statement against a person’s general interests, 
regardless of the strength of those interests, is not admissible 
unless it carries legal ramifications. 
In sum, Rule 804(b)(3)’s four requirements look at 
whether a reasonable person, aware of the consequences, would 
make a statement.  This analysis boils down to a rational actor 
paradigm.69  Like Rule 804(b)(3), rational actor theory 
considers the action of a reasonable person, acting consciously 
and fully aware of the consequences of acting.70  Proponents of 
rational actor theory maintain that “actors strive to maximize 
their material self-interest.”71  The Rule presumes that if such an 
actor consciously makes a statement against his legal interests, 
and at the instant of the declaration comprehends the 
consequences of that statement, the statement is likely to be 
true.  Besides never being subjected to empirical scrutiny,72 this 
proposition fails to withstand common sense scrutiny. 
Rule 804(b)(3) suffers from a fundamental psychological 
flaw.  Rational actors do not consciously act against their 
personal interests.73  Rather, the most basic articulation of 
rational actor theory instructs that actors are motivated only by 
 
 68 Id. 
 69 In this Article, I do not endorse rational actor theory as flawless.  See 
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1471, 1473 (1998) (“Objections to the rational actor model in law and 
economics are almost as old as the field itself.”).  Rather, my argument is that 
as long as Congress adopts a rational actor paradigm for Rule 804(b)(3), it is 
essential that the rule remain faithful to rational actor theory. 
 70 See Wiliam S. Blatt, Interpretive Communities: The Missing Element in Statutory 
Interpretation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 629, 637 (2001) (discussing rational actor model). 
 71 Edward L. Rubin, Putting Rational Actors in Their Place: Economics and 
Phenomenology, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1705, 1715 (1998). 
 72 Welsh S. White, Accomplices’ Confessions and the Confrontation Clause, 4 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 753, 763 (1996). 
 73 Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
543, 638 (2000) 
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self-interest.74  Rational actors possess “a ranked set of 
preferences that function according to basic logical 
principles.”75  Rational actors, in turn, act in congruence with 
these preferences, allowing for the prediction of behavior based 
on the actor’s expected utility.76  Gary Becker explained that “all 
human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who [1] 
maximize their utility [2] from a stable set of preferences and 
[3] accumulate an optimal amount of information and other 
inputs in a variety of markets.”77  Although humans have 
bounded rationality, stemming from limited computational 
skills and seriously flawed memory, rational actors nonetheless 
strive to follow their set of preferences to maximize utility.78  
Therefore, if a person voluntarily acts in a manner that fails to 
reflect these preferences, and is aware that he is acting 
inconsistently with these preferences but chooses to act that way 
nonetheless, the person ceases to function as a rational actor.  
Yet, this is precisely the sort of irrational behavior that Rule 
804(3) contemplates in admitting statements against interests. 
Furthermore, in weighing Rule 804(b)(3)’s reliability, 
Congress conflated personal interests with legal interests.  To 
paraphrase the rule’s well-accepted rationale, a person does not 
make a statement harmful to himself unless that statement is 
likely to be true.79  Even if this rationale were to hold water, the 
purported reliability would rest on an individual’s personal 
interests, the strongest interests a person possesses.  These are 
the interests that affect a rational actor’s decisionmaking 
process.  Any influence to state a falsehood would arise from an 
individual’s personal interests in not telling the truth.  The 
rationale of Rule 804(b)(3) thus requires an identity of personal 
and legal interests. 
Common experience, however, tells us that this assumption of 
 
 74 Id. 
 75 Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New 
Behavioral Law and Economics Movement, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 973, 976-77 
(2000); see also Geoffrey Rapp, The Economics of Shootouts: Does the Passage of 
Capital Punishment Laws Protect or Endanger Police Officers, 65 ALB. L. REV. 1051, 
1056 (2002) (arguing that a “rational actor” model may be appropriate in the 
context of violence against police officers because such violence may be less 
likely to result from emotional impulses). 
 76 Rostain, supra note 75, at 977. 
 77 GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 
(1976). 
 78 Jolls et al., supra note 69, at 1479. 
 79 See supra PART I.B. 
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the identity of personal and legal interests is highly flawed.  Acting 
against personal interests is undesirable for the actor per se, whereas 
acting against legal interests may or may not be undesirable.  A 
statement can be contrary to a person’s legal interests, however, in 
the person’s view it is nevertheless in his personal interest to make 
the statement.  A person’s personal and legal interests most notably 
fall out of line when a reasonable person makes a statement against 
his penal interests.  When a reasonable person makes a conscious 
decision to make a statement against his penal interests, that person 
has concluded that some other interest overrides his penal interests.  
Perhaps the declarant is hoping to exculpate a friend or loved one.  
Or the declarant may be willing to incur civil liability to advance some 
other interest.  When personal and legal interests fall out of line, the 
reliability rationale of the rule collapses, rendering no greater 
reliability to this type of hearsay than to any other. 
Intuition also supports this criticism.  When reasonable 
persons consciously act, they determine at that point in time 
that the act is in their interests, regardless of the presence of 
resultant effects that an outside observer might perceive as 
deleterious or undesirable.  Such action in accordance with self-
interests is the definition of a rational act.80  Any person who 
acts otherwise is not behaving rationally.  The result may be 
behavior that seems bizarre and irrational to an outside 
observer, but nonetheless is highly rational for the actor.  
Criminals voluntarily confess because they believe it is in their 
interests to do so.  For some reason, perhaps a desire to expiate 
his guilt, to gain notoriety, or to strike a deal with the 
authorities, the suspect deems it in his personal interests to 
confess.  Therefore, although the confession is contrary to the 
criminal’s penal interests, the confession is still consistent with 
the criminal’s personal interests. 
Furthermore, the plain text of the rule overlooks a critical 
element of rational actor theory.  An important part of the 
utility function of most people is bounded self-interest.81  People 
often care, and more importantly act as if they care, about 
others in certain circumstances.82  For instance, a wife who 
makes a self-incriminating statement to protect her husband 
from criminal prosecution acts in accord with her interests.  She 
is fully aware of her action and decides, at that moment in time, 
 
 80 Freeman, supra note 73, at 638; Rostain, supra note 75, at 976-77. 
 81 Jolls et al., supra note 69, at 1479. 
 82 Id. 
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that her optimal scenario is to save her husband from criminal 
prosecution.  Therefore, the strongest interests influencing the 
wife are concerns for the situation of another person.83 
Equally compelling arguments apply to statements subjecting a 
person to pecuniary or proprietary liability.  Although these 
statements may be financially harmful, they are not against the 
person’s interests if made freely and consciously.  The requirements 
of the rule again defeat the reliability rationale.  If these statements 
were perceived by the declarant to be against his interests at the time 
of the declaration, and the declarant behaved as a rational actor, the 
declarant would never make the statement.  Rather, there must be 
some other personal interests to explain the statement.  Therefore, 
statements against pecuniary or proprietary interests can be just as 
calculated and susceptible to fabrication as any other hearsay 
statement. 
Even if a person acts in a manner that he later deems to be 
against his interests, the person still considered the behavior in 
line with his interests at the point of action.  For instance, a 
criminal who chooses to commit a crime made a conscious 
decision that criminal activity is in his best interests at that 
point in time.  If at a subsequent time, the criminal is arrested, 
he likely will determine that the criminal act was not in his 
personal interests.  This does not change the criminal’s 
perception at the instant of acting that committing the crime 
was the right choice.  In addition, many smokers who develop 
lung cancer may realize that smoking was not in their interests.  
This future realization does not change the fact that, at the 
instant of deciding to start to smoke, these individuals 
considered smoking consistent with their interests.  Similarly, if 
the wife in the above example later regrets making the self-
incriminating statement, that does not change the fact that she 
initially viewed the statement as consistent with her interests.  
Both Rule 804(b)(3) and rational actor theory evaluate the 
decisionmaking that occurs at this first moment in time, not the 
second.84 
 
 83 Cf. United States v. White, 240 F.3d 127, 138 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming 
sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice for a defendant who 
convinced his girlfriend to tell the police that she owned drugs that were 
actually his). 
 84 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Dubious Reliability of Statements Against Penal Interests 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes praised the reliability of 
statements against penal interests, commenting that “no other 
statement is so much against interest as a confession of murder . 
. . .”85  This reliability guarantee is the most fundamental 
justification for admitting statements under Rule 804(b)(3).  
Congress made clear that reliability must be the focus of the 
rule when it deleted language concerning statements contrary 
to social interests.86  Courts have consistently kept reliability 
concerns paramount in interpreting Rule 804(b)(3),87 with the 
most notable example being the Supreme Court’s reasoning for 
refusing to extend the scope of the rule to collateral, non-
inculpatory statements in Williamson.88 
The reliability of statements against penal interests that 
Justice Holmes lauded may make sense at first glance.  Persons 
generally do not want to find themselves in prison, so it would 
seem logical that penal interests carry notable strength.  Upon 
further reflection, however, this logic falls apart.  As Professor 
Glen Weissenberger observed, while the rationale of Rule 
804(b)(3) may have superficial appeal, “common experience 
also teaches that individuals will fabricate or tell half-truths 
despite the personal consequences in order to protect friends or 
family members or to incriminate enemies.”89  Both a basic 
consideration of motives for lying and significant empirical 
research reveal extremely compelling reasons to fabricate self-
inculpatory statements in criminal trials. 
Several potential flaws reside in self-inculpatory statements.  
First, the declarant may have ulterior motives to deceive the 
authorities.  Indeed, courts have been skeptical of inculpatory 
statements against penal interests because the declarant may be 
motivated to make false statements to curry favor with the 
authorities, or to shift or share blame for a crime.90  This 
concern becomes intensified for statements made in the course 
of a plea-bargaining.  During plea negotiations, persons have 
 
 85 Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 278 (1913) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
 86 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 87 See supra note 56. 
 88 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 89 Weissenberger, supra note 22, at 1118. 
 90 Andrew R. Keller, Note, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest and 
the Confrontation Clause, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 159, 163-64 (1983). 
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patent motivations to curry favor with the police and to lie.  
Accordingly, courts have subjected statements made in the 
course of plea-bargaining to close scrutiny.91  The Advisory 
Committee appeared concerned with this flaw when it cautioned 
against allowing statements made to a grand jury to fall within 
the scope of Rule 804(b)(3).92  The Committee argued that the 
statements may not truly be against interests, but rather may be 
an attempt to gain favor with the authorities.93  The note to Rule 
804(b)(3) warns that a “statement admitting guilt and 
implicating another person, made while in custody, may well be 
motivated by a desire to curry favor with the authorities and 
hence fail to qualify as against interest.”94 
The declarant may also possess a desire to deceive 
authorities in order to inculpate another individual.  The Fifth 
Circuit, in United States v. Sarmiento-Perez,95 noted that “the 
enmity often generated in a conspiracy gone awry” could 
provide clear motive to falsify accusatory statements.96  While 
bizarre, it is certainly within reason to envision situations where 
intense enmity and hatred would induce someone to take such 
extreme action.97 
In the eyes of many, the greatest concern as to the validity 
of a statement against penal interests stems from aggressive and 
coercive police interrogation techniques.98  These methods can 
 
 91 See RICHARD O. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH 
TO EVIDENCE 491 (2d ed. 1982) (noting that because “statements to law 
enforcement officials may be part of a plea bargaining process or may be 
otherwise motivated by a desire to curry favor . . . .  [S]uch statements are 
subject to close scrutiny”). 
 92 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to Subdivision (b), 
Exception (3). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 633 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 834 (1982). 
 96 Id. at 1102. 
 97 See Keller, supra note 90, at 164 (“Other motives to falsify may be 
present even when there is no fear of reprisal for admitting a crime: the 
desire to share blame with another; the wish for revenge; the hope of 
diverting attention from oneself; and even publicity—seeking or simply 
lying.”). 
 98 The crisis of coerced false confessions arising from improper 
interrogation techniques has received extensive scholarly attention. See, e.g., 
GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS AND 
TESTIMONY (1992); Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of 
False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of 
Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998) 
[hereinafter Leo & Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions]; Albert W. 
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elicit emotional shock, which in turn distorts a person’s memory 
during the interrogation.99  Although especially high for 
suggestible criminal suspects,100 this danger is equally 
conceivable for potential witnesses in criminal trials.  Police 
interrogation methods can endeavor to dupe an individual into 
submitting a harmful statement with the ultimate intention of 
using that statement against another individual.  Even though 
such psychologically-induced false confessions appear to be 
occurring with troubling frequency, police and criminal justice 
professionals seem to be doing little to stop them.101 
A related problem involves false confessions that do not 
arise from police pressure, the so-called “voluntary false 
confessions.”102  The bizarre psychology explaining these 
confessions causes great concern with the reliability of Rule 
804(b)(3).  Individuals who voluntarily provide false confessions 
often go to the police station and inform the authorities that 
they committed the crime.103  Lawrence Wrightsman and Saul 
 
Alschuler, Constraint and Confession, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 957 (1997); Gail 
Johnson, False Confessions and Fundamental Fairness: The Need for Electronic 
Recording of Custodial Interrogations, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 719 (1997); Richard 
J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision To Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and 
Irrational Actor, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979 (1997) [hereinafter Ofshe & Leo, The 
Decision To Confess Falsely]; Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the 
Constitution: Safeguards Against Unworthy Confessions, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 105 (1997); Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of 
Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987).  For thorough 
discussions of police interrogation techniques, see GUDJONSSON, supra, at 24-
49, and Ofshe & Leo, The Decision To Confess Falsely, supra, at 985-1050. 
 99 GUDJONSSON, supra note 98, at 224 (citing HUGO MUNSTERBERG, ON THE 
WITNESS STAND: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOLOGY AND CRIME (1908)). 
 100 One of the most well-known examples of police convincing an 
impressionable suspect that he committed a crime involved Peter Reilly, who 
falsely confessed to killing his mother after a grueling interrogation.  Two 
years after Reilly’s conviction of first-degree manslaughter, the judge granted 
Reilly a new trial and the prosecutor declined objection to the defense’s 
motion to dismiss the manslaughter charge.  See, e.g., DONALD S. CONNERY, 
GUILTY UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT 53-79 (1977) (describing police 
interrogation techniques that resulted in Peter Reilly’s confession); Johnson, 
supra note 98, at 722-23; White, supra note 98, at 125-28 (using Peter Reilly as 
an example of a suggestible suspect); David Howard, New Mission: Recording 
Police Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1997, at 1 (describing Peter Reilly’s 
story). 
 101 Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 88 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 621, 689-90 (1996) (citations omitted). 
 102 Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the “Innocent”: An Examination of Alleged Cases of 
Wrongful Conviction from False Confessions, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 523, 603 n.423 
(1999). 
 103 Id. at 691 n.290. 
 2002 REFORMING FRE 804(b)(3) 21 
Kassin cite three explanations for voluntary false confessions.  
The first cause, and most important one, is a deranged desire 
for the publicity and attention that the false confession will 
attract.104  The individual has a pathological need to become 
infamous, even if the consequences mean imprisonment.105  The 
danger is particularly real for high-profile crimes.  The more 
well-known the offense, the more likely false confessors will 
emerge.106  For example, over 200 people “confessed” to the 
Lindbergh kidnapping.107  Second, Wrightsman and Kassin 
argue that the individual may wish to expiate guilt for a previous 
wrongful act.108  This individual may feel the need to subject 
himself to punishment and use a false confession as the means 
to that end.  Wrightsman and Kassin’s third reason is that the 
person may be unable to distinguish between fact and fantasy.109  
A person acting under this motivation is delusional and may 
have hallucinated or dreamt that he committed the crime. 
Doctor Gisli Gudjonsson adds a fourth possible 
explanation, which bears particular relevance to Rule 
804(b)(3).  Gudjonsson argues that “people may volunteer a 
false confession . . . in order to assist or protect the real 
culprit.”110  While Gudjonsson believes this reason is most 
common in minor cases, he also believes it can occur in major 
criminal cases, such as homicide.111  If Gudjonsson is correct 
and the reasoning he describes occurs with any discernible 
frequency, the trustworthiness of a statement against penal 
interests is all but eliminated.  An example of this is the case of 
George Parker, who claimed he confessed to aggravated 
 
 104 LAWRENCE WRIGHTSMAN & SAUL KASSIN, CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTROOM 
76 (1993). 
 105 GUDJONSSON, supra note 98, at 226. 
 106 Leo, supra note 101, at 691 n.290. 
 107 GUDJONSSON, supra note 98, at 226; Leo, supra note 101, at 691 n.290 
(citing Miles Corwin, False Confessions Not Good for Investigator’s Souls, DENVER 
POST, May 4, 1996, at 22A). 
 108 WRIGHTSMAN & KASSIN, supra note 104, at 77. 
 109 Id. 
 110 GUDJONSSON, supra note 98, at 226. 
 111 Id.  Gudjonsson cites evidence that confessing to a crime in order to 
protect somebody else, such as a friend, is particularly common in juvenile 
cases.  Id.  One study of a specialized forensic unit for juveniles found that 
23% claimed to have made a false confession to the police in order to protect 
a friend or a relative from possible prosecution.  Id. (citing Graeme 
Richardson, A Study of Interrogative Suggestibility in an Adolescent Forensic 
Popular 87 (unpublished M.Sc. thesis, Univ. of Newcastle Upon Tyne)(on file 
with author)). 
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manslaughter because he was in love with the woman who 
actually committed the crime.112  For an individual like George 
Parker, his “confession” was not truly against his interests 
because his strongest interest was to protect his girlfriend. 
Professor Paul Cassell agrees with Gudjonsson that a desire 
to protect others often results in false confessions.113 In fact, 
Cassell suggests that a motivation to protect others leads to even 
more false confessions than coercive interrogation 
techniques.114  According to Cassell, “[c]ommon sense suggests 
that suspects will more often ‘confess’ for understandable 
reasons (such as protecting a loved one) than because police 
have somehow convinced them they actually committed a 
crime.”115  As support, Cassell cites Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson’s 
study of false confessions among Icelandic prisoners, which 
revealed that “48% [of false confessions] stemmed from 
‘protecting a significant other,’ such as a peer, a friend, or a 
relative.”116  In addition, Cassell suggests that this figure may be 
greater in the United States given the “Icelandic ‘inquisitorial 
legal system.’”117  Furthermore, the Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson 
figure covers wrongful confession. Cassell estimates that because 
suspects are more likely to redact police-induced false 
confessions than voluntary false confessions, the proportion of 
police-induced confessions is likely to be approximately 38%.118 
This concern surrounding false, self-inculpatory statements 
is intensified by the declarant’s ability to assert his Fifth 
Amendment privilege after making the initial statement.  Courts 
have held that invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination satisfies Rule 804’s unavailability 
requirement.119  After offering the self-inculpatory statement, 
 
 112 See Bedau & Radelet, supra note 98, at 150-51 (citing State v. Parker, 93 
N.J. 260, 460 A.2d 665 (1983) (describing the case of George Parker)). 
 113 Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent From False Confessions and Lost 
Confessions—and From Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497 (1998). 
 114 Id. at 519. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. (citing Gisli H. Gudjonsson & Jon Sigurdsson, How Frequently Do False 
Confessions Occur?: An Empirical Study Among Prison Inmates, 1 PSYCHOL. CRIME 
& L. 21, 23 (1994)). 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 See, e.g., United States v. Sasso, 59 F.3d 341, 349 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The 
declarant’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination constitutes unavailability.”); United States v. Matthews, 20 F.3d 
538, 545 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the unavailability condition was met 
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the declarant can refuse to make the statement again and can 
even refuse to acknowledge that the initial declaration was ever 
made.  As a result, the consequences of making the self-
inculpatory statement are minimized. 
These reliability concerns led to the corroborating evidence 
requirement for admission of self-inculpatory statements that 
serve to exculpate a defendant, suggesting an implicit 
acknowledgement by Congress that these statements retain 
inherently dubious reliability.  The House Judiciary Committee 
recognized that statements “tending to exculpate the accused 
are more suspect and . . . should have their admissibility 
conditioned upon some further provision insuring 
trustworthiness.”120  As a result, if a court determines a 
statement to be contrary to the declarant’s criminal interests 
and would serve to exonerate the defendant, the court must 
consider whether corroborating circumstances clearly indicate 
the trustworthiness of the statement.121  Although the 
determination of whether corroborating evidence exists lies 
within the discretion of the trial court,122 the court should 
consider several factors, including (1) the time and the party to 
whom the statement was made, (2) the existence of 
corroborating circumstances in the case, (3) “the extent to 
which the declaration is” truly against the declarant’s interests, 
and (4) “the availability of the declarant as a witness.”123  Some 
courts have interpreted the corroborating evidence requirement 
 
because the declarant was a codefendant who elected not to testify); FED. R. 
EVID. 804(a)(1) (defining unavailability to include assertion of a privilege).  
If granted immunity, however, the witness no longer satisfies the 
unavailability requirement of Rule 804.  Weissenberger, supra note 22, at 
1083. 
 120 FED. R. EVID. 804 House Judiciary Committee Report. 
 121 United States v. Thomas, 571 F.2d 285, 290 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding 
corroborating circumstances clearly indicating trustworthiness because the 
defendant was only marginally involved in the crime, as opposed to the 
declarant who was the mastermind, and because the chance of fabrication 
was slight because the statement was spontaneous); United States v. Oropeza, 
564 F.2d 316, 325 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding insufficient corroborating 
evidence to indicate trustworthiness because the declaration was not 
spontaneous, the declaration was given to its proponent at trial, and the 
declaration was not truly inculpatory of the declarant), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
1080 (1978). 
 122 United States v. Vega, 221 F.3d 789, 803-04 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 
531 U.S. 1155 (2001); United States v. Hoyos, 573 F.2d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 
1978); United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743, 754 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 839 (1977). 
 123 Oropeza, 564 F.2d at 325; Guillette, 547 F.2d at 754. 
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as erecting a significant bar.  The First Circuit has instructed 
that minimal corroboration is insufficient because “Congress 
meant to preclude reception of exculpatory statements against 
penal interests unless accompanied by circumstances solidly 
indicating the trustworthiness.”124  At the very least, the 
corroboration requirement demonstrates judicial 
acknowledgement that a statement against penal interests is 
suspect. 
III.  PROPOSED REFORMULATION OF RULE 804(b)(3) 
These deficiencies force us to reconsider the wisdom 
behind Rule 804(b)(3), and ponder an approach that more 
effectively guarantees reliability.  This reformulation would 
entail two prongs, both of which individually address the 
shortcomings identified earlier.125  First, the language of the 
rule must better comport with human reasoning.  Reasonable 
people do not consciously act against their interests.  As an 
alternative, an inquiry into whether the statement, if false, 
would be against the person’s interests contains stronger indicia 
of reliability because it is consistent with rational actor theory.  
The second modification is simple: return to the common law 
rule by eradicating any hearsay exception for statements 
pertaining to penal interests.  Both empirical studies and 
common experience indicate that the reliability rationale is 
weakened tremendously for statements against penal interests.126 
A.  Restructuring the Focus of Rule 804(b)(3)’s Inquiry 
The underlying goal of Rule 804(b)(3) is praiseworthy.  
Our justice system should create rules of evidence that enable 
the admission of statements that are unlikely to be false.  
Unfortunately, the current language does not achieve this end.  
As discussed earlier, reasonable persons act in their own 
interests.127  Someone who consciously and truly acts contrary to 
his interests is no longer acting reasonably.  Therefore, when a 
 
 124 United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 253 (1st Cir. 1976) (“[T]here is 
no question but that Congress meant to preclude reception of exculpatory 
hearsay statements against penal interest unless accompanied by 
circumstances solidly indicating trustworthiness.  This requirement goes 
beyond minimal corroboration.”). 
 125 See supra PART II. 
 126 See supra PART II.B. 
 127 See supra PART II.A. 
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reasonable person consciously makes a declaration contrary to 
his legal interests, that person is acting in accordance with some 
stronger, personal interests. 
It is possible to minimize, if not eliminate, this flaw.  A 
more sensible inquiry queries whether a statement, if false, 
would go against the individual’s personal interests.  This 
approach acknowledges that statements made consciously and 
reasonably are perceived by the declarant to be in furtherance 
of his interests, while simultaneously grounding the reliability in 
the fact that the statements would be against the individual’s 
interests if false.  Unlike the current structure of Rule 
804(b)(3), this formulation is consistent with the thought 
processes of rational actors. 
This formulation would play out in two ways.  First, the 
exception would only apply to statements that have significance 
to the declarant’s personal interests.128  For example, a 
mundane observation about the weather would be inadmissible 
because if that statement were false, it would not be against the 
individual’s interests.  Only considerations important to a 
person are ranked sufficiently high to affect rational choice.129  
In other words, to achieve sufficient reliability to justify 
admission, the statement must be of the sort that a reasonable 
person would not make if it were untrue. 
Some examples may be instructive.  A straightforward 
illustration involves an individual’s monetary interests.  If a 
debtor (“D”) says he owes a creditor (“C”) money, that 
statement would be admissible under this reformulation.  The 
statement is not reliable because it goes against D’s interests, 
because if it truly went against D’s interests, he would not have 
made the statement.130  In addition, it is not necessarily against 
D’s interests to admit to owing a debt.  D may be influenced by a 
bounded self-interest that causes him to consider the situation 
of C.131  Moreover, it may be in D’s interest to acknowledge the 
debt because of the legal ramifications of lying or acting in bad 
faith.  D’s statement is reliable, however, because if the 
 
 128 As I will discuss in the next section, these personal interests should not 
extend to penal interests that serve to exculpate an accused defendant 
because of the intensified reliability concerns discussed in Part II.B.  See infra 
PART III.B. 
 129 See Rostain, supra note 75, at 977. 
 130 See supra PART II.A. 
 131 See supra notes 81-82. 
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statement were untrue, it clearly would have been against D’s 
interests to make the declaration.  No reasonable person would 
have made such a statement if it were false, so it must be true. 
Under the same fact pattern, if D told C that he has money, 
that statement would fall under the rule because it would be 
against D’s interests if the statement were false.  If D were 
penniless, it would be against his interests to tell a creditor that 
he in fact had money.  As such, D’s statement is reliable not 
because an acknowledgement of possessing money is against D’s 
interests, but because if the statement was untrue, the statement 
would be against D’s interests.  No rational actor would 
fabricate in this situation, so D’s statement carries sufficient 
guarantees of reliability to warrant admission. 
The second way this formulation would play out involves 
the limited admissibility of the statements to the portions that 
retain enhanced reliability.  Under this restructured rule, the 
declaration would be admitted only to the extent to which it 
would go against an individual’s interests.  In the example 
mentioned above, if D stated that he owed C $500, that 
statement would be probative only for the limited proposition 
that D owed at least $500.  If D lied to the extent that D actually 
owed less than $500, it would have been against D’s interests to 
make the statement.  No reasonable actor would have made 
such a false statement, so the statement must be true.  D’s 
statement would not be probative, however, for the proposition 
that D does not owe more than $500.  If D actually owed C 
$1,000, D’s acknowledgement of owing $500 would be false and 
still would be aligned with D’s personal interests.  Therefore, 
D’s statement retains no special reliability for the proposition 
that he does not owe more than $500, and should not be 
admitted for that purpose. 
Along similar lines, if a property owner (“O”) stated his 
property line extends to a certain point, the statement is 
reliable for the proposition that O’s property does not extend 
beyond that point.  If O’s property actually extended beyond 
that point, O’s statement would be against his interests.  
Because no rational actor would make such a false statement, 
the statement must be true.  Again, however, this statement 
would have limited admissibility.  O’s statement would not be 
probative for the proposition that O owns no less than that 
designated amount, because the reliability guarantee collapses.  
If O in fact owned less property, O’s original statement could be 
both false and consistent with his personal interests. 
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Needless to say, admitting evidence of a limited purpose is 
commonplace in American courtrooms.  Judges frequently 
present juries with evidence admissible only for a specific 
purpose.  For example, evidence of prior acts is not considered 
character evidence if admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 
404(b).132  To be admissible under Rule 404(b), the evidence 
must serve some other purpose besides showing action in 
conformity therewith, such as evidence of motive, common 
plan, or intent.133  The opposing party may request the judge to 
provide the jury with a limiting instruction, informing the jury 
of the proper scope of the evidence.134 
It is also common for courts to parse out-of-court 
statements so that only those segments with reliable probative 
force are admissible.  For example, statements made for medical 
diagnosis are only admissible to show the injuries suffered, and 
how they were suffered, but not to prove liability.135  The reason 
is that the added reliability of a statement against medical 
interests pertains only to the declarant’s interests in receiving 
proper medical care.  This added reliability of truthfulness does 
not extend to how the injury was caused.  The Court also 
required similar parsing with Rule 804(b)(3) in Williamson.136  
The Court opined that the exception should not extend to 
collateral, non-inculpatory statements because they lack 
adequate indicia of reliability.137  Therefore, under Williamson, 
only those portions of a declaration that are inculpatory are 
admissible. 
 
 132 FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith.”). 
 133 Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Mack, 258 F.3d 548, 552-53 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(holding the admission of a prior unindicted bank robbery proper for the 
limited purpose of proving identity, and not for showing the defendant’s 
propensity for criminal activity); United States v. Butch, 256 F.3d 171, 176-77 
(3d Cir. 2001) (permitting the admission evidence of an accused drug 
trafficking conspirator’s prior dealing with coconspirators to rebut 
defendant’s claim that he acted without criminal intent). 
 134 FED. R. EVID. 105 (“When evidence which is admissible as to one party 
or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another 
purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its 
proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.”). 
 135 FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note (“[A] patient’s statement 
that he was struck by an automobile would qualify but not his statement that 
the car was driven through a red light.”). 
 136 Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 598-602 (1994). 
 137 Id. at 605; see supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 28 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:001 
B.  Eradicating Admission of Statements Against Penal Interests 
The reliability of statements pertaining to penal interests is 
simply too suspect to justify a hearsay exception.  As discussed 
earlier, explanations abound for why persons make self-
incriminating statements.138  Depending on the circumstances, 
these fabrications can unfairly exculpate or inculpate criminal 
defendants, both of which are socially undesirable scenarios.  In 
criminal trials, where society has such compelling interests, 
these flaws are unacceptable.  The solution is simply to remove 
any inclusion of penal interests and limit Rule 804(b)(3) to 
statements against a declarant’s personal interests. 
This modification would hardly be a ground-breaking 
venture for evidentiary law.  The exclusion of statements against 
penal interests has strong roots in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence.  In fact, deletion of the clause pertaining to 
penal interests would mark a return to the common law and the 
American rule prior to adoption of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.  The common law rule, presented in Sussex Peerage 
and other English cases,139 refused to admit statements against 
penal interests.140  Prior to enactment of the Federal Rules, “the 
overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions” adopted this 
English rule.141 
In addition, the Supreme Court firmly rejected statements 
against penal interests prior to the enactment of Rule 
804(b)(3).  In Donnelly v. United States,142 the Court reviewed a 
murder conviction in which the trial judge excluded testimony 
offered by the defendant that a deceased third party confessed 
to the murder.143  Justice Pitney’s opinion relied heavily on 
Sussex Peerage and American case law in holding the evidence 
inadmissible.144  The Court reasoned “it is almost universally 
 
 138 See supra PART II.B. 
 139 Another English case restricting the declaration against interests 
exception was the Berkeley Peerage Case.  See Donnelly v. United States, 228 
U.S. 243, 273 (discussing the Berkeley Peerage Case). 
 140 Sussex Peerage Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (H.L. 1844). 
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held that this must be an interest of a pecuniary character.”145  
Justice Pitney further noted the “great and practically 
unanimous weight of authority in the state courts against 
admitting evidence of confessions of third parties, made out of 
court, and tending to exonerate the accused.”146 
Furthermore, although the Federal Rules include the penal 
interests clause, there is far from unanimous agreement on this 
approach.  Even states that have adopted rules of evidence that 
track the Federal Rules differ on the admissibility of statements 
against penal interests.  At least six of these “Federal Rules” 
states, which include Arkansas, Florida, Maine, Nevada, North 
Dakota, and Vermont, continue to exclude inculpatory 
statements against penal interests.147 
CONCLUSION 
We cannot help but laud the objective of Rule 804(b)(3).  
In enacting the rule, Congress sought to advance our legal 
system’s liberal thrust in admitting reliable evidence that assists 
the fact-finder.  Notwithstanding this liberal thrust, however, 
any evidence presented to the fact-finder must be reliable.  This 
concern with reliability is most pressing for hearsay 
declarations, which are inherently suspect.  Therefore, the 
exceptions to the general bar against admitting hearsay are 
grounded in some enhanced reliability in the particular 
declaration.  Congress believed Rule 804(b)(3) secured this 
enhanced reliability. 
Congress was wrong.  Statements against legal interests 
retain no special reliability to warrant a hearsay exception.  The 
current structure of Rule 804(b)(3) is marred with 
psychological inconsistencies and errors that make the admitted 
hearsay far less reliable than it initially may seem.  In fact, 
under the very rational actor theory on which the current rules 
rest, statements against legal interests provide no stronger 
guarantee of trustworthiness than any other hearsay declaration. 
As I argue in this Article, however, it is possible to 
reformulate Rule 804(b)(3) in a manner that would achieve the 
reliability guarantees that Congress desired.  Instead of 
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considering the impossibility of whether a reasonable person is 
behaving against his interests, the rule should consider whether 
a statement, if untrue, would be against the person’s non-penal 
interests.  Unlike the present rule, this reformulation is 
consistent with the actions of reasonable persons. 
 
